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1 Introduction
External effects (spillovers) pervade economies and societies in general. Both inter- and intra-
industry cross interaction between firms have been the object of studies, since at least the work of
Marshall (1890), for the former, and Jacobs (1969), for the latter.1 Social interactions also have
a crucial importance in the determination of individuals’ well-being, as pointed early by Becker
(1974) and recently emphasized by the literature on social capital.2
Given the importance and pervasiveness of these external effects, it is natural that individuals
and firms may want to control and manipulate the size and scope of those external benefits to
their advantage. For example, regional economists have convincingly shown that economic agents
agglomerate in few locations in the economic landscape, precisely in order to reap these localization
externalities (Ciccone and Hall 1996, Guiso and Schivardi 2007).3 In a similar vein, it is difficult
to understand technological collaboration agreement between firms (“joint ventures” and other
similar contracts) without thinking that these are done to control external effects (d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin 1988).4 Finally, the persistent stratification of social groups among many dimensions
(such as income, race, education) is prima facie evidence of the desire of social groups to arrange
themselves so as to internalize spillovers (Tiebout 1956, Benabou 1993).
In this paper, we endeavour to fathom the interactions between productive effort and the cre-
ation of synergies. We model this interaction in a way that allows us to characterize how agents
devote resources to both activities optimally. In turn, this permits a full-fledged equilibrium/welfare
analysis of individual decisions and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. The model
is also flexible enough to be brought to the data.
The environment Our model has two main ingredients.
First, given a structure of synergies, the model has a simple linear quadratic structure. More
precisely, payoffs are linear quadratic in own productive effort, while spillovers are generated by
paired agents and are multiplicative in own’s and other’s productive effort. We allow for two
different sources of heterogeneity. On the one hand, agents can differ in their marginal returns to
own productive effort. One the other hand, for identical levels of productive efforts, spillovers can
vary with the strength of the synergistic linkage across different pairs of agents. It turns out that
this payoff structure allows to pin down exactly how the level of productive effort varies with the
pattern of external effects exerted on each individual, and with the idiosyncratic characteristics of
the agents.5
1See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a review of this literature.
2Coleman (1990) and Putnam (2000) are standard references. Sobel (2002) and Durlauf (2002) offer critical
surveys of this literature.
3See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey.
4See also Suzumura (1992).
5As in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006). See also Ballester and Calvó-Armengol (2006).
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Second, we assume that agents devote a (joint) amount of resources to building synergies with
others, whomever these others are. Socialization is thus captured by a scalar, rather than by
a vector of decisions telling how much to interact with every other agent. This socialization or
synergistic effort determines the strength of the synergistic linkage across different pairs of agents.
More precisely, agents control the total level of synergies they are involved in. How this aggregate
synergy value is distributed across different pair-wise interactions depends on the distribution of
socialization efforts of the other agents. Finally, recall that the spillover between two given agents
is equal to the product of their respective productive efforts weighted by the synergy value of their
interaction.
The main innovation of our study is, precisely, that the synergistic effort is generic −a scalar
decision. Socializing is not equivalent, in our approach, to elaborating a nominal list of intended
relationships, as in the literature on network formation surveyed by Jackson (2005). This is re-
alistic in many applications,6 particularly when networks are so large that keeping track of every
participant becomes a burdensome task. As a matter of fact, most of our results are established
for large networks. In addition, this shortcut greatly improves the tractability of the model. Un-
like with richer models of link formation, we can resort to off-the-shelf Nash equilibrium analysis
without being burdened by the extreme (combinatorial) multiplicity problems of the other models.7
As a result, we can perform a standard type of equilibrium analysis that equates marginal costs
and benefits of both production and socialization. Of course, this equilibrium characterization also
greatly simplifies welfare and comparative statics analyses.
In some cases, our model with synergies of varying strengths across different pairs of players8
can also be understood as a (multinomial) model of a random graph, where independent link
probabilities correspond to the synergistic values. Albeit simple, this random graph model is
flexible enough to encompass many (if not all) of the topological properties of real life networks.
Our equilibrium analysis naturally inherits all the descriptive topological features of this random
graph model (as well as its limitations, of course). At the same time, our analysis permits to draw
a close connection between topological features and welfare and economic implications. We believe
6Researchers go to fairs, or congresses to listen, to be listened to, and to meet other investigators in general. More
generally, face-to-face meetings among agents that share a common location often result from random encounters
among these agents, as the early literature on segregation indexes already points out (Bell 1954).
7 In a typical game of network formation, players simultaneously announce all the links they wish to form with. The
links that form are those that are mutually announced by both partners. The cost of creating and maintaining links
are then payed. As a consequence of the large multi-dimensional strategy space, and because link creation requires
the mutual consent of the two involved parties, a severe coordination problem arises. As such, the game often displays
a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, and very different network geometries can arise endogenously. A partial solution to
this problem can be found by allowing pair-wise or coalitional deviations, or by restricting to cooperative-like network
stability notions (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Jackson (2005) surveys this literature, while Calvó-Armengol and
Ilkiliç (2006) derive the connections between this approach and standard game-theoretic refinements.
8See Bloch and Dutta (2005) for a model with endogenous link strength but in a standard framework of non-random
network formation.
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that this link between topology, equilibrium and welfare is the main value added of the model.
In spite of its parsimony that ensures tractability, the model retains enough richness to replicate
a (relatively) broad range of empirical regularities displayed by social and economic networks, and
is directly estimable to recover is structural parameters.9
Results We first characterize the equilibria of the model, when agents take their decision
about their productive effort and their socialization effort simultaneously. We show that there are
two interior equilibria and one (partially) corner equilibrium, when a sufficiently large number of
individuals is implicated. The (partially) corner equilibrium where agents do not invest at all in
building synergies is unstable. Instead, the two interior equilibria are stable. Existence and stability
of interior equilibria are obtained when the level of cross synergies as well as the heterogeneity in
individual traits are not too high, which amounts to bounding from above a compound index of
both payoff parameters.
For large enough populations, equilibrium actions take a particularly simple form. Recall that
agents can display different marginal returns to own productive effort. We label “individual type”
the value of this marginal return at the origin. We first show that the ratios of productive as well
as socialization efforts across different pairs of agents are all equal to the ratio of their individual
types. In other words, at equilibrium, the productive and socialization efforts for a given agent are
the product of his individual type with some baseline values for the productive and socialization
efforts. These baseline values, in turn, are obtained from a system of two equations with two
unknowns that admits exactly two positive solutions −hence the two interior equilibria.
This simple equilibrium characterization has a number of interesting implications. In particular,
we can show that one of the interior equilibria displays both higher socialization and productive
effort than the other, so that we can talk of high-action and low-action equilibrium. It also turns
out that the high-actions equilibrium is Pareto superior.
An important question is then how an exogenous change in the returns to production and
socialization affect the relative production and socialization efforts at equilibrium. In turns out
that, when the returns increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium,
while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage change in
socialization effort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive effort. We think this
may provide an explanation, for example, of the large increase in agreements of collaboration in
R&D in the recent past (Caloghirou, Ioannides, Vonortas 2003). It could also explain the decline
in social capital documented by Putnam (2000).
We then turn to the implications of the model for the topology of networks. When synergy
values are all between zero and one, our equilibrium socialization efforts can be interpreted as a
(multinomial) random graph with independent link probabilities, where the expected number of
9See Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) for an interesting application of random networks to the labor market.
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links accruing to each agent (also known as the degree of the corresponding network node), is equal
to the socialization effort of this agent.
Models of random graph with given expected degree sequence (here, the equilibrium profile of
socialization efforts) have been analyzed by Chung and Lu (2002). They can replicate some (if
not all) of the observed features of real-life networks, and our equilibrium model inherits all the
descriptive possibilities as well as limitations of this random graph model. For instance, random
graph models with given expected degree sequence can replicate any distribution of the number of
relationships per person in a population (also known as the degree distribution). In our case, the
distribution of network degrees has a one-to-one relationship with the distribution of individual
traits in the population, the latter shaping the former. So, one can potentially replicate any degree
distribution by fine-tuning the distribution of individual types adequately. However, this also
implies that heavy-tailed degree distributions, which are sometimes (but not always) encountered in
real-life networks,10 call for a fat-tailed distribution of individual traits. Note, however, that fat tails
have a close connection with lognormal distributions, which call for multiplicative (dynamic growth)
processes (Mitzenmacher 2004, Jackson and Rogers 2007), whereas our analysis concentrates on a
static (one-shot Nash) equilibrium concept.
Random graphs models with given expected degree sequence can also give a good account of
the low average network distance usually observed in real-life networks, and so does our equilibrium
model. At the same time, it cannot account for the typically high observed clustering (the friends
of my friends are typically my friends as well), as links are created independently. However, we
discuss how a small modification of our model could deliver moderately high values for this clustering
coefficient as well.
It turns out that a close examination of equilibrium payoffs demonstrates that individuals of the
same type are better off if they are matched only with others of the same type or higher. This should
generate a tendency to observe at least some homogeneous groups, as long as segregating institutions
or mechanisms are available. For this reason, and also to check the robustness of previous results,
we also examine the model with homogeneous groups, but also with a more general cost structure.
We show that only two stable interior equilibria still exist. And, as in the heterogeneous case, the
increase in the returns to socialization induce a larger percentage change in socialization effort than
in productive effort. Finally, in the homogeneous case we can also characterize the conditions for the
emergence of giant components. That is, we can show the parameters for which completely intra-
connected subgroups comprising a large majority of the population exist. These giant components
are a feature of many real life networks.
To summarize, we propose a methodology that can usefully relate network topology to economic
features of the model (and vice versa), which is an advantage with respect to other models that
replicate well observed network topology.11 This, however, is achieved at the cost of losing the
10See Table 1 and Figure 2 in Jackson and Rogers (2007).
11Kirman (1983), Kirman, Oddou and Weber (1986) and Ioannides (1990) propose and analyze early models relating
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ability to describe some observed features.
Another virtue of our approach is that the model is suitable for estimation with readily available
data. By recovering the deep parameters of the model, we can make a welfare assessment and com-
parison of real life networks, and ponder the impact of potential interventions. With an illustrative
purpose, we perform one such exercise. Using data from a network of high school friendships, and
using the education outcomes of members of the said network, we recover the parameters which
would generate the observations (if our model is correct). We then compare the results of the fitted
model with the observed network topology and perform comparative statics exercises. We also
do some policy experiments by constructing artificial societies with restricted (more homogeneous)
subgroups, and we observe the effect of a mean preserving spreads on the distribution of types.
Our model with link intensities and heterogeneous types has also been used to recover network
structure from survey questionnaire data asking how many people of a set of types the responders
know (Zheng, Salganik, Gelman 2006).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, and introduces the baseline
game as well as the replica game. Section 3 contains the equilibrium and welfare analysis. The
comparative statics results are gathered in Section 4. Section 5 discuss the equilibrium and welfare
implications for (and from) the network topology. Section 6 analysis the particular case of homoge-
neous populations with general cost structures, and the emergence of giant components. All proofs
are gathered in the appendix.
2 The game
The replica game N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players, and T = {1, . . . , t} is a finite set
of types for these players. We let n be a multiple of t, that is, n = mt for some integer m ≥ 1, so
that there is the same number of players of each type.
More precisely, we refer to the case n = t as the baseline game, and to the general case n = mt
as the m−replica of this baseline game. In an m−replica game, there are exactly m players of each
type τ ∈ T .
For each player i ∈ N , we denote by τ (i) ∈ T his type.
We consider a simultaneous move game of network formation and investment. The returns
to the investment are the sum of a private component and a synergistic component. The private
returns are heterogeneous across players and depend on their type. We denote by b = (b1, ..., bt)
the profile of these private returns, where 0 < b1 ≤ b2 ≤ ... ≤ bt. Even though each type in the
replica game has the same number of individuals, we can match any finite distribution of types in
a population by adding multiple copies of an individual type.
The synergistic returns depend on the network formed on account of individual choices, as
random networks of interaction with economic outcomes.
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described below.
Network formation Consider some m−replica game, m ≥ 1. Let n = mt.
Each player i selects a number si ≥ 0 which corresponds to a level of socialization effort. Let
s = (s1, ..., sn) be a profile of socialization efforts. Then, i and j interact with a link intensity given
by:
gij(s) = ρ (s) sisj (1)
By definition, links are symmetric, that is, gij = gji. We also allow for self-loops (when i = j).
The total intensity of the links accruing from a given player i is:
gi(s) =
nX
j=1
gij(s) = ρ (s) si
nX
j=1
sj .
We set
ρ (s) =
(
1/
Pn
j=1 sj , if s 6= 0
0, if s = 0
(2)
so that gi(s) = si, that is, players decide upon their total interaction intensity. In this model, the
exact identity of the interacting partner is not an object of choice. Rather, players choose their
total socialization intensity that they devote to each and every possible bilateral interaction in
proportion to the socialization effort of these partners.
As a matter of fact, the functional form in (1) and (2) can be tied back to simple properties of
the link intensity gij (s), as established below.
Lemma 1 Suppose that, for all s 6= 0, the link intensity satisfies:
(A1) symmetry: gij (s) = gji (s), for all i, j;
(A2) aggregate constant returns to scale:
Pn
j=1 gij (s) = si;
(A3) multiplicative separability: gij (s) = siψj (s), where ψj : Rn+ → R+;
then, the link intensity is given by the functional form (1) and (2).
Notice that (A2) and (A3) reflect the fact that i controls his total number of contacts si, but
the actual composition depends on the others’ investments.
When maxi s2i < 1/ρ (s), all link intensities are between 0 and 1. In this case, we can view
the network as a random graph where gij(s) is the probability of having an edge between i and j,
and links are independent across different pairs of players. This is the random graph model with
given expected degrees s = (s1, ..., sn) described, e.g., in Chung and Lu (2002) that can replicate
many of the degree distributions encountered in real-life networks, such as power laws, Poisson
distributions, etc.12
12See Ioannides (2006), Jackson (2007) and Vega-Redondo (2007) for more on random graphs and their connections
to economics.
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Investment Each player i selects a number ki ≥ 0 that corresponds to an investment level.
The choices of si and ki are simultaneous. Let k = (k1, ..., kn) be a profile of investments. The
individual investment yields both a private and a synergistic return.
The private returns to player i depend only on his investment level ki and his individual traits,
summarized by bτ(i). They are captured by a simple quadratic expression bτ(i) ki − k2i /2.
The synergistic returns depend on both (k, s). They correspond to a collection of cross effects
kikj weighted by a factor reflecting the link intensity between i and j shaped by s. More precisely,
we assume that:
∂2ui(k, s)
∂ki∂kj
= agij(s), for all i 6= j, (3)
for some parameter a ≥ 0 capturing the size of the synergistic returns.
Notice that the symmetry (A1) in Lemma 1 is tantamount to payoffs being twice continuously
differentiable in the productive effort k.
Payoffs Player i’s utility is given by:
ui(k, s) = bτ(i) ki + a
nX
j=1,j 6=i
gij (s) kjki −
1
2
k2i −
1
2
s2i (4)
Payoffs are a linear-quadratic function of kis with non-negative cross effects (3) reflecting strate-
gic complementarities in investment levels. The size agij(s) ≥ 0 of these complementarities depends
on the profile of socialization efforts, and varies across different pairs of players.
3 Equilibrium analysis and Pareto ranking of equilibria
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
We solve for the interior Nash equilibria in pure strategies (k∗; s∗) = (k∗1, ..., k
∗
n; s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
n) of the
m−replica game with heterogeneous types b = (b1, ..., bt), and for m large enough.
Under some conditions that we provide, there are exactly three such equilibria. In one (partially
corner) equilibrium, the level of socialization effort is null for all players. The two other equilibria
are interior. We characterize these interior equilibria when the population gets large.
We first identify the (partially) corner equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 2 For all m−replica game, (k∗i , s∗i ) =
¡
bτ(i), 0
¢
for all i = 1, ...,mt is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with corresponding equilibrium payoffs b2τ(i)/2.
This is a strict equilibrium, thus it cannot be discarded on the basis of standard refinements.
However, this equilibrium is not stable for sufficiently large populations, as we will show later. For
this reason, we concentrate on the interior equilibria, which we now characterize.
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Define:
a(b) = a
Pt
τ=1 b
2
τPt
τ=1 bτ
. (5)
Holding the average type
Pt
τ=1 bτ/t constant, the parameter a(b) increases with the hetero-
geneity in types. More generally, a(b) increases with the ratio
Pt
τ=1 b
2
τ/
Pt
τ=1 bτ , which many
authors refer to as the second-order average type (e.g., Vega-Redondo 2007). When types are all
homogeneous, that is, b1 = ... = bt = b, we have a(b) = ab.
Theorem 1 Suppose that 2/3
√
3 > a(b) > 0. Then, there exists an m∗ such that for all m−replica
games with m ≥ m∗, there are exactly two interior pure strategy Nash equilibria. These pure strategy
Nash equilibria are such that, for all players i of type τ , the strategies (ki, si) converge to (k∗τ(i), s
∗
τ(i))
as m goes to infinity, where k∗τ(i) = bτ(i)k, s
∗
τ(i) = bτ(i)s, and (k, s) are positive solutions to:(
s = a(b)k2
k [1− a(b)s] = 1
. (6)
Under the conditions on a(b) stated in Theorem 1, the system of two equations (6) with two
unknowns has exactly two positive solutions. We also show that both solutions get arbitrarily
close to an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the m−replica game as m gets large. But
the equilibrium correspondence is locally continuous at an interior equilibrium. Thus these two
positive solutions of (6) are approximate pure strategy Nash equilibria of the m−replica game.
Finally, Theorem 1 establishes that all interior pure strategy Nash equilibria of the m−replica
game are in the neighborhood of a positive solution to (6) when m gets larger.
Table 1 shows population size versus accuracy for the homogenous case where all individuals
are of type 1.
Table 1: Simulations on Theorem 1 with a = 2, t = 1 and b1 = 0.1.13
m 2 5 10 20 50 100 500 ∞
Low equilibrium
k∗ 1,898 1,195 1,101 1,065 1,049 1,046 1,046 1,046
s∗ 2,366 815 458 303 234 222 218 219
High equilibrium
k∗ 3,346 4,643 4,591 4,508 4,444 4,420 4,400 4,394
s∗ 3,506 3,923 3,911 3,891 3,875 3,869 3,864 3,862
13Numbers are multiplied by 104.
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For the case of an homogeneous population with common trait b, one can verify that the exact
equilibrium equations are: (
s = abk2
¡
1− 1m
¢2
k
£
1− abs
¡
1− 1m
¢¤
= 1
If one then expresses this system as a single equation with a third order polynomial in s, it can
easily checked that the approximation error is of the order of m−3/2. In particular, when m = 100,
the approximation error is 10−3.
The two equations (6) equalize marginal costs with marginal benefits at equilibrium for each ac-
tion available to the players. Consider some player i with type bτ(i). At an approximate equilibrium
(k∗i , s
∗
i ) = bτ(i) (k
∗, s∗), where (k∗, s∗) are solutions to (6).
The marginal cost corresponding to an investment level k∗i is equal to k
∗
i itself. Given that at
equilibrium marginal cost equals marginal benefit, the marginal benefit from this investment is
bτ(i)/(1− a(b)s∗)
which we obtain from the second equation in (6).14 When a = 0, this marginal benefit boils down
to bτ(i), which coincides with the private return in (4). When a 6= 0, the private return is scaled up
by a synergistic multiplier 1/(1− a(b)s∗), which is homogeneous across players. It is an increasing
function of the second order average type a(b), a measure of population heterogeneity.
Similarly, the marginal cost corresponding to a socialization level s∗i is equal to s
∗
i itself. The
marginal benefit now is a complicated expression in si’s and ki’s, but as the population size gets
large, it approximately boils down to
aρ (s)
nX
j=1,j 6=i
kikj
The approximate equilibrium solution equates this marginal benefit to the marginal cost s∗i for all i.
Theorem 1 gives a closed form expression for this fixed point. It is already apparent, nevertheless,
that the equilibrium value of s∗i is of the order of k
2.
Figure 1 plots equations (6).
[Insert F igure 1 here]
From the graph, it is clear that the system (6) needs not always to have a non-negative solution.
The condition 2/3
√
3 > a(b) is necessary and sufficient so that the two graphs of the two equations
cross in the positive orthant of the space (k, s). To understand this, notice that when a(b) is too
large, the synergistic multiplier operates too intensively and both s and k increase without bound.
Remark 1 When 0 < a(b) < 2/3
√
3, the system of equations (6) has two different non-negative
solutions. When a(b) = 2/3
√
3, there is a unique non-negative solution (k, s) =
¡
3/2,
√
3/2
¢
.
When a(b) > 2/3
√
3, there is no non-negative solution.
14This is obtained by multiplying the second equation in (6) by bτ(i).
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The socialization effort at equilibrium varies across players in a way that reflects their relative
types bτ(i). Formally,
s∗i
s∗j
=
bτ(i)
bτ(j)
.
Therefore, the intensity of a particular link at an approximate equilibrium is:
gij (s∗) = s∗
bτ(i)bτ(j)
m
Pt
τ=1 bτ
, (7)
which decreases linearly with 1/m, inversely proportional to the population sizemt. For this reason,
the overall socialization effort gi (s∗) = s∗bτ(i) is independent of the population size. This kind of
population invariance allows us to work with large populations, where we can discard effects of
second-order magnitude without being burdened with population size effects.
Since there are two interior equilibria, plus one partially corner equilibrium, it is legitimate to
wonder about the stability of these equilibria.
Proposition 1 For m sufficiently large, the two interior equilibria are stable while the equilibrium
with (k∗i , s
∗
i ) =
¡
bτ(i), 0
¢
for all i = 1, ...,mt is not stable.
3.2 Pareto ranking of equilibria
Given an approximate equilibrium (k∗, s∗), we denote by u (k∗, s∗) = (u1 (k∗, s∗) , ..., um (k∗, s∗))
the corresponding equilibrium payoffs.
The previous result shows that, under some conditions on the exogenous parameters of the
game, there are exactly two approximate equilibria as the population gets larger. The next result
compares equilibrium actions and payoffs across these two approximate equilibria.
Proposition 2 Let (k∗, s∗) and (k∗∗, s∗∗) be the two different approximate equilibria of anm−replica
game. Then, without loss of generality, (k∗, s∗) ≥ (k∗∗, s∗∗) and u (k∗, s∗) ≥ u (k∗∗, s∗∗), where ≥
is the component-wise ordering.
In words, the equilibrium actions are ranked component-wisely and the equilibrium payoffs
are Pareto-ranked accordingly. So, the equilibrium multiplicity identified in Theorem 1 reflects
a coordination problem. In one equilibrium, all players exert a high socialization effort, thereby
contributing to building high cross synergies (3) across them. In turn, this induces them to incur
high private investments so that they can all reap these high synergistic returns. This is the
high-action and Pareto-superior equilibrium. In the other equilibrium, socialization efforts and
the resulting cross synergies are low, which hampers the level of private investments. This is the
low-action and Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
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4 Comparative statics
4.1 Socialization and investment
We enquire how the equilibrium actions respond to changes in exogenous parameters. More precisely
we keep track of changes in socialization and investment as a(b) changes. Recall that a(b) is a
compound index of the parameter for the synergistic return a, and the second order average type,
a measure of population heterogeneity.
Proposition 3 Suppose that a(b) increases. Then, in both approximate equilibria of the replica
game, the percentage change in socialization effort is higher than that of productive effort (in ab-
solute values), for all agents.
Note that the statement of the proposition boils down to showing that the elasticity of si with
respect to ki for changes in a(b) is smaller than one, at all equilibria. However, in equilibrium, the
ratio si/ki is constant across all agents. So, if we can establish that socialization is more responsive
than productive effort for changes in a synergistic multiplier equal to a(b) in an homogeneous
population with types normalized to 1, the result follows. Inspecting the expression for the payoffs
in a homogeneous population
ui(k, s) = ki + a(b)
nX
j=1,j 6=i
gij (s) kjki −
1
2
k2i −
1
2
s2i
it is now clear that a(b) affects directly the marginal benefit of si through the synergistic multiplier.
There are various ways in which a(b) can increase.
First, through an increase in a, that captures the size of synergistic returns.
Second, through an increase in the second-order average type
Pt
τ=1 b
2
τ/
Pt
τ=1 bτ , a measure of
the variability in private returns, which is a source of idiosyncratic heterogeneity in our model.
For instance, a mean-preserving spread in private returns (where
Pt
τ=1 bτ is held constant whilePt
τ=1 b
2
τ increases) shifts upwards the second-order average type.
Third, through an upward simultaneous shift in all the bτ ’s, and the a. These upward shifts can
all be of different intensities for different parameters. Else, it can be an homothetic shift, where
all parameters are scaled up by the same factor. In particular, consider the following variation of
payoffs (4)
ui(k, s) = bτ(i) ki + a
nX
j=1,j 6=i
gij (s) kjki −
α
2
k2i −
α
2
s2i , (8)
with α > 0. The equilibria of the game with these payoffs (8) is equivalent to the game analyzed so
far where the exogenous parameters bτ(i) and a, and thus the compound index a(b), are all scaled
by 1/α.
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Proposition 3 encompasses all those cases and many others, and pins down the absolute and
relative variation of the si’s and ki’s for all these multifarious changes in parameters. We now turn
to the absolute variations or comparative statics of the equilibrium actions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that a(b) increases while keeping bτ constant, for one arbitrary given type
τ . Then, at the Pareto-superior approximate equilibrium the equilibrium actions of all player i such
that τ (i) = τ decrease, while at the Pareto-inferior approximate equilibrium all the equilibrium
actions of all player i such that τ (i) = τ increase.
Remark 2 Recall that at an approximate equilibrium (k∗i , s
∗
i ) = bτ(i) (k
∗, s∗), where (k∗, s∗) are
solutions to (6). As a matter of fact, we prove a stronger result establishing that any general
arbitrary increase of a(b) results in a co-movement of both s∗ and k∗ (increasing in the Pareto-
inferior equilibrium, and decreasing in the Pareto-superior one). As long as the change in a(b)
keeps bτ(i) constant or moves it in the right direction, the comparative statics of (k∗i , s
∗
i ) coincide
with those of (k∗, s∗) .
To understand the comparative statics of (k∗, s∗), we can think, again, about the homogeneous
case. Then, in Figure 2, at the low equilibrium, strengthening the marginal returns to productive
efforts leads to an increase in both socialization and investment. At the high action equilibrium,
instead, this increase in synergistic returns allows players to save on costs, thus reducing both
socialization and investment.
[Insert F igure 2 here]
4.2 Equilibrium payoffs
The next result documents the comparative statics of individual and aggregate equilibrium payoffs.
When m gets large, these are given by the following expression:
u∗i =
b2τ(i)
2a(b)
s
k
+ o (1) , for all i = 1, ...,mt. (9)
=
b2τ(i)
2
k + o (1) , for all i = 1, ...,mt. (10)
Note that (10) is deduced from (9) through the first equation of (6).
When only a increases, while all the bt’s remain constant, the comparative statics of equilibrium
payoffs are those of productive actions, as can be deduced from (10).
When the exogenous payoff parameters (a; b1, ..., bt) are scaled up by some common factor λ ≥ 1,
this induces an upward shift from a(b) to λ2a(b). In a similar vein, b2τ(i) increases to λ
2b2τ(i). The
multiplicative factor λ2 thus appears both in the numerator and in the denominator of (9), and
the change in equilibrium payoffs is driven solely by the change in the ratio s/k, where (k, s) are
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solutions to (20). It turns out that the monotonicity of s/k is tied to the elasticity of s∗i with
respect to k∗i and to the monotonicity properties of s
∗
i and k
∗
i , whose behavior is characterized in
Proposition 3.
Finally, adding up equilibrium payoffs in (9) we get the following:
mtX
i=1
u∗i =
m
Pt
τ=1 bτ
2a
s
k
.
Changes in aggregate payoffs following a change in parameters are thus related to changes in s/k
and the sum of the productivity parameters divided by a.
These considerations lead to the following result.
Proposition 5 Let (k∗, s∗) ≥ (k∗∗, s∗∗) be the two ranked approximated equilibria of an m−replica
game.
1. Suppose that either only a increases, or (a; b1, ..., bt) are all scaled up by a common multiplica-
tive factor. Then, at the Pareto-superior approximated equilibrium all the payoffs ui (k∗, s∗)
decrease, while at the Pareto-inferior approximated equilibrium all payoffs ui (k∗∗, s∗∗) in-
crease, for all i = 1, ...,mt.
2. Suppose that the vector (b1, ..., bt) changes via a mean preserving spread (i.e. a change that
holds
Pt
τ=1 bτ constant but increases
Pt
τ=1 b
2
τ ). Then, at the Pareto-superior approximated
equilibrium the sum of payoffs
Pmt
i=1 ui (k
∗, s∗) decreases, as well as payoffs for types below the
average. At the Pareto-inferior approximated equilibrium the sum of payoffs
Pmt
i=1 ui (k
∗∗, s∗∗)
increases.
The next result characterizes the preferences of each type with respect to the composition mix
of the population in individual traits.
Remark 3 Fix i and let b0−τ(i) and b−τ(i) be two different population types (excluding i). If
a(bτ(i),b−τ(i)) ≥ a(bτ(i),b0−τ(i)), then player i gets a lower (resp. higher) utility at the Pareto
superior approximated equilibrium (resp. at the Pareto inferior approximated equilibrium) under
(a, bτ(i),b−τ(i)) that under (a, bτ(i),b0−τ(i)).
The individual preferences over group composition documented in Proposition 3 allow for group
comparisons across populations with different number of types as well as different number of indi-
viduals for each type, as long as Theorem 1 holds.
Recall that types are ordered as follows: 0 < b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bt. Then, it is readily checked
that:
a (b1) ≤ a (b1, b2) ≤ · · · ≤ a (b−t) ≤ a (b) ≤ a (b−1) ≤ a (b−1−2) ≤ · · · ≤ a (bt−1, bt) ≤ a (bt) .
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So, invoking Remark 3 that characterizes individual preferences over group composition, we can
conclude that at the Pareto superior equilibrium, low types prefer to segregate themselves from the
rest of the group, while high types prefer to wander around with types lower than themselves. This
is because the overinvestment in socialization hits harder the low types, who reap a lower value
from this socialization.
Inversely, high types wish to segregate from lower types at the Pareto inferior equilibrium.
Again, this is because the underinvestment hits hard higher types.
So, if extreme types have a means to separate themselves from the rest of the group, simple
unravelling dynamics induces full segregation by types, and thus homogeneous subpopulations.
5 Topology
5.1 Theory
Large social networks display a number of key empirical regularities, as reported by many studies
analyzing an ever increasing number of available data on social networks.15
First, the distribution of network connectivities tends to be fat tailed for some networks (see
Jackson and Rogers 2007 for amendments to this claim). That is, there is in some networks a much
higher proportion of network nodes with a high number of network links than if the network links
were created uniformly and independently at random.
Second, the average distance (or shortest path) between two network nodes is very small com-
pared to the network size, and grows very slowly with this size. For instance, the network of actors
who have acted together in at least one Hollywood movie comprises 225,226 individuals and has
an average path length of 3.65.16
Third, the tendency of two given linked nodes to be linked to a common third-party, which is
called the clustering coefficient, is much higher than in a purely random network. For instance, the
actual clustering coefficient displayed by the movie actor network is almost 3,000 times higher that
of a purely random network with identical average connectivity.
Beyond these key empirical features, social networks tend to exhibit an internal community
structure, sometimes arranged hierarchically. Also, highly connected nodes tend to be connected
with highly connected nodes like themselves, and poorly connected nodes with poorly connected
nodes, a feature often referred to as positive assortativity. Etc.
There are a number of mechanisms for network formation that replicate these topological fea-
tures. The basic ingredients are a population growth process, and a link formation device for new-
15See, for instance, Albert and Barábasi (2002), who describe evidence on the topology of the world-wide web,
science collaboration graphs, the web of human sexual contacts, and movie actor collaboration. More recent studies
include, e.g., the network of email communication (Guimerà et al. 2007). Jackson and Rogers (2007) contains detailed
references to a number of social networks displaying rich and disparate features.
16See Albert and Barábasi (2002).
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comers that combines random meetings with network (local) search for the partner. The growth
process together with the network search generate preferential attachment dynamics. That is, pos-
itive feed-back loops whereby newcomers tend to connect with a handful of super-connectors, that
become even more connected, and so on. This leads to a fat tailed connectivity distribution17 and
to a highly clustered network. The random meetings decrease average distance by creating bridges,
but mitigate the fat tailed connectivity distribution.
Our model of network formation is static −a simultaneous move game. As such, it cannot be
expected to replicate genuinely dynamic features observed in the data, e.g., the high clustering.
Yet, it can still deliver some interesting implications for the topology of network links and, more
importantly, relate topology to individual incentives.
Recall that the network formed on account of player’s socialization decisions defines the syner-
gistic technology available to everyone. This, in turn, determines the returns to private investments,
whose levels are also left at the discretion of those who form the network. Our equilibrium analysis
thus sheds light on the interplay between network formation and the private economic use of this
jointly created device, and connects topological features of the network to individual behavior and
payoffs.
For all x ∈ Rt+, define x =
Pt
τ=1 xτ/t, and v (x) =
Pt
τ=1 x
2
τ/t − x. These are, respectively,
the average and the empirical variance of the coordinates of x. We extend this definition to any
non-negative vector in an Euclidean space of finite arbitrary size.18
Consider an approximate equilibrium (k∗, s∗) of the m−replica game, that corresponds to some
solution (k∗, s∗) to (6).
Theorem 1 and (7) imply that the distribution of socialization efforts gi (s∗) = s∗i = s
∗bτ(i) is
related, at equilibrium, to the distribution of types b = (b1, ..., bt). When all such link intensities
are smaller than one, we can interpret our weighted network as a random graph, where each link
ij is formed with independent probability gij (s∗). This random graph has an expected connectiv-
ity sequence (s∗1, ..., s
∗
n). We can map the population ex ante heterogeneity into the connectivity
distribution for the equilibrium random graph.
More precisely, the average connectivity is s∗ = s∗b, proportional to the average type.
Also, the empirical variance of connectivities is v (s∗) = s2∗v (b). Therefore,p
v (s∗)
s∗
=
p
v (b)
b
. (11)
The heterogeneity in connectivities in the resulting equilibrium network is thus solely driven
17Preferential attachment breeds a multiplicative growth process for connectivities. The log of the connectivity
distribution is thus additive through time. By the Central Limit Theorem, we conclude that the log of the connectivity
distribution follows a normal distribution. The degree distribution is thus lognormal, a fat tail distribution barely
distinguishable from a Pareto distribution. Mitzenmacher (2004) gives an excellent historical overview of generative
models for heavy-tailed distributions.
18For all x ∈ Rn+, we set x =
?n
i=1 xi/n, and v (x) =
?n
i=1 x
2
i /n− x, for all n ≥ 1.
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by the heterogeneity in private returns, and is thus the same for both equilibria. Increasing the
latter increases the former, and by varying b adequately we can cover a broad range of random
graph topologies, including the heavy tailed connectivity distributions identified in the data.19
For instance, a mean-preserving spread in b increases
p
v (s∗)/s∗, and leads to a connectivity
distribution with a fatter tail.
Beyond this comparative statics about ratios (11), Proposition 3 allows to conduct comparative
statics directly about the average connectivity s∗ and the variance v (s∗).
More precisely, a mean-preserving spread in private returns b has an indirect effect on the
average connectivity (through the change in s∗, the solution to (6)), and both a direct and an
indirect effect on the variance of connectivities (through both the change in s∗ and the change in
v (b). At the low-action equilibrium, both the variance and the average connectivity increase. At
the high-action equilibrium, instead, the average connectivity decreases while the impact on the
variance remains ambiguous. Invoking Proposition 5, we can conclude that an increase in both
the variance and the average connectivity is concomitant to a decrease in total welfare. Instead, a
decrease in average connectivity together with an increase in the variance of connectivities comes
together with an increase in total welfare (provided, of course, that the variations in the network
topology result from a mean-preserving spread in private returns).
Note that an increase in a alone also affects the variance and the average connectivity through
the resulting impact on s.
More generally, an increase in a (b) increases the variance and the average connectivity at the
low-equilibrium, and decreases the average connectivity at the high-equilibrium, although it may
have an ambiguous impact on
p
v (s∗)/s∗.
Our static model also allows to draw conclusions on the average distance in the equilibrium
random network. Following Chung and Lu (2002) the average distance in a random graph with
given expected connectivity (s∗1, ..., s
∗
n) = s
∗ ¡bτ(1), ...., bτ(n)¢ is given by:20
(1 + o (1))
log (mt)
log
¡
s∗b
¢ .
This average distance increases slowly with the population size mt.
When the level of synergistic returns a increases while private returns b = (b1, ..., bn) remain
constant, the average distance decreases at the low equilibrium while equilibrium payoffs increase.
Instead, the average distance increases at the high equilibrium together with a decrease of equilib-
rium payoffs.
Suppose now that a and b change homothetically, and are all scaled up by a common para-
meter. We still have a decrease of the average distance coupled with increasing payoffs at the low
equilibrium. The impact of this exogenous change of parameters at the high equilibrium is now
19Notice, however, that a fat tailed degree distribution requires a fat tailed distribution of population traits.
20Provided that link intensities are all smaller than one, and under some additional technical conditions.
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ambiguous. However, an increase of the average distance can only happen at this high equilibrium,
and is then concomitant with a decrease in payoffs for all agents.
The impact of a mean-preserving spread in private returns on the average distance is similar
to a change in the level a of synergies. That is, the average distance goes down and the average
payoffs go up at the low equilibrium, and reciprocally at the high equilibrium (average distance up
and average payoffs down).
The next table summarizes this discussion.
Table 2. Comparative statics in the low and high equilibrium
Low equilibrium High equilibrium
s v (s) Clust. dist. payoffs s v (s) Clust. dist. payoffs
a up + + + − + − − − + −
(a,b) all up + + + − + · · · · −
b spread + + + − +
(total payoffs)
− · · + −
(total payoffs)
Our static model of network formation does not generate networks with a high clustering level.
Indeed, suppose that link intensities are smaller than one so that we have a random graph. Take
three nodes i, j, l such that i and j are linked, and so are j and l. Then, the probability that i
and l are linked when m is high is roughly gil (s∗), independent of the links ij and jl and of the
order of the inverse of population size. More precisely, an approximate expression for the size of
the clustering is:21
1
mt
s∗
b
µ
1 +
v (b)
b
¶2
.
The previous expression suggests how a small variation of the model can deliver moderate levels
of clustering. Split the population into (even numbered) subpopulations of finite size (smaller
replica of the game). Let f be the number of such subpopulations. Consider now f different
meeting rooms, and an (f + 1) th meta-meeting room that encompasses them all. Assign each
subpopulation into one meeting room (a one-to-one assignment). Suppose now that a fraction 1−ε
of the socialization effort of each player is invested in-home, in the meeting room of the player,
while a residual fraction ε is invested in the meta-meeting room that encompasses them all. We get
an equilibrium network that consists on small communities of players (formed within each meeting
room) with some bridges across communities. When ε is small enough, the equilibrium actions
are approximately those characterized in Theorem 1. The smaller the size of each community,
the bigger the clustering level (for identical average connectivity). However, this goes against our
21This clustering coefficient is computed averaging over all players, the percentage of triangles they are involved
in, out of the total potential triangles.
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characterization of equilibrium actions in terms of approximate equilibria which are closer to the
true Nash equilibria the bigger the population size.
Finally, empirically observed social networks sometimes display a giant component, that is,
they contain a subnetwork including a huge share of the population and for which there is a path
inside it connecting any two players in this population share.22 In the section 6.2 below, we provide
conditions on the exogenous parameters of the model for the emergence of a giant component for
the case of an homogeneous populations, b1 = ... = bt, and general costs.
5.2 An empirical illustration
Our model is well suited to learn about the driving economic forces behind the observed structure of
networks and outcomes. Using data from an acquaintanceship network and the related education
outcomes of a set of individuals, we can recover the parameters that generate the observations
according to our model. We can then compare the results of our fitted model with existing topology
and even perform comparative statics exercises as well as seeing the outcome of relevant policy
experiments by recombining types and operating mean spreads on the distribution of types.
Four our analysis, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Ad-
dHealth). The AddHealth database has been designed to study the impact of the social environment
(i.e. friends, family, neighborhood and school) on adolescents’ behavior in the United States by
collecting data on students in grades 7-12 from a nationally representative sample of roughly 130
private and public schools in years 1994-95. AddHealth contains unique detailed information on
friendship relationships, based upon actual friends nominations.23
The in-home questionnaire contains detailed information on the grade achieved by each student
in mathematics, history and social studies and science, ranging from D or lower to A, the highest
grade (re-coded 1 to 4). We calculate a school performance index for each respondent.24
By merging the in-home data to the in-school friendship nominations data and by excluding
the individuals that report a non-valid answer to the target questions, we obtain a final sample of
11,964 pupils distributed over 199 networks. For our exercise, we take the network comprising the
largest number of individuals that has 107 nodes.
For this network, we focus on the following two columns of information:
• the degree connectivity of each node in the network, that we denote si, i = 1, ..., 107
• the student achievement for each node in the network, that we denote ei, i = 1, ..., 107
22However, giant components are not always the rule. For instance, the biggest component of a network of scientific
collaborations among academic economists analyzed by Goyal, Moraga-González and van der Leij (2005) comprises
33,027 authors out of a total of 81,217 authors, that is, 40.7 percent of the total population.
23Pupils were asked to identify their best friends from a school roster (up to five males and five females).
24We then use the Crombach-α measure is to assess the quality of the derived variable. We obtain an α equal to
0.86 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) indicating that the different items incorporated in the index have considerable internal consistency.
19
The data, thus, provides a measure of si for each individual, and a perhaps imperfect measure
of ki for each one, ei. We first perform a transformation of the performance measure. We write ei =
kβi exp(εi). Equilibrium conditions in Theorem 1 imply that si/ki = s/k (a constant). Therefore,
ei =
µ
k
s
si
¶β
exp(εi).
We then run the following OLS regression:
log(ei) = δ + β log(si) + εi.
We find bδ = −2.5126 and bβ = 1.3264, both significant at 1% level. We perform the following
change in variable: ki = e
1/?β
i , which can be rewritten as log ki = (log ei) /bβ, and thus log (ki/si) =
log
hbδ/bβi. Given that si/ki = s/k, we use exp[−bδ/bβ] as an estimator for the ratio k/s.
The first equation in (6), s = a(b)k2, together with the fact that ki = bτ(i)k, implies that
ki =
bτ(i)
a(b)
s
k
.
We do a Maximum Likelihood fit of the following equation:
ki =
bτ(i)
a(b)
exp[−bδ/bβ] + νi, i = 1, ..., 107,
conditional on a(b) < 2/3
√
3.
To conduct this empirical fit, we assign players to types in the following way. In the first
estimation we allow only for four different types (b1, ..., b4) and we assign each agent to the type
corresponding to his place in the distribution of ki by quartiles. In the second specification with
ten heterogeneous parameters (b1, ..., b10), we divide agents in deciles.
We obtain the following parameter fits:
(a; b1, b2, b3, b4) = (0.15; 1.22, 1.43, 1.59, 1.78) (12)
(a; b1, ..., b10) = (0.19; 1.12, 1.17, 1.25, 1.34, 1.46, 1.57, 1.62, 1.75, 1.88, 1.96) (13)
Once we have the types, it becomes possible to think about segmentations of the population
according to types, and to establish the impact on the welfare of the affected individuals.
For example, suppose we have a population like the one resulting from the quartile estimation
(12). Suppose the individuals from such population are recombined in groups with only two types.
Then it is easy to check, invoking Remark 3, that individual preferences rank partners in decreasing
value of their type for the high equilibrium, and they are ranked in the opposite order for the low
equilibrium.
For instance, at the high equilibrium, type 1 players prefer a group with type 2 partners, to
one with type 3 partners, themselves preferred to type 4 partners. In this particular case, at both
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equilibria the only stable pair-wise matching groups types 1 with types 2, and types 3 with types
4. Notice, however, that this stable matching is not the one that maximizes social welfare at the
high equilibrium.
Continuing with the same example, and now allowing for groups with more than two types, the
(decreasing) order of preference for type 1 player at the high equilibrium is the following: groups
only types (1), then with types (1, 2) , (1, 3) , (1, 2, 3) , (1, 2, 4) , (1, 2, 3, 4) , (1, 4) and finally (1, 3, 4).25
6 The case of homogeneous populations
Remark 3 implies that individuals of the either extreme type prefer a society composed only of
individuals such as themselves to any other mixture. Provided that the institutional environment
allows them to segregate themselves, they will form a separate society. One should thus expect that
at least some homogeneous groups would exist in a given society. However, given that at least some
of the types within a subgroup would lose from the segregation of the opposite types, it should not
be excluded that the society would not leave complete freedom for segregation at all levels, and
heterogeneous group may anyway form.26
In what follows, we concentrate our attention on homogeneous groups, for which we can conduct
some robustness checks on the technology and for which further insights on the topology are possible.
6.1 Equilibrium analysis and comparative statics
We now consider an homogeneous population of players with a single type corresponding to private
returns b, but allow for non-linear marginal costs of both socialization and investment. Player i’s
utility is:
ui(k, s) = bki + a
nX
j=1,j 6=i
gij (s) kjki −
1
c+ 1
kc+1i −
1
c+ 1
sc+1i , (14)
where a, b ≥ 0 and c ≥ 1. The case c = 1 corresponds to quadratic costs. As c increases, the cost
function becomes steeper.
We focus on symmetric equilibria, where all (homogeneous) players choose the same socialization
effort and invest the same amount. Such symmetric equilibria give rise to random graphs where the
25We can also use the estimated types to illustrate the comparative statics of a mean preserving spread in the
population composition. We divide the 107 nodes into (roughly) 27 agents of each type. Then, we compute the
equilibrium payoffs for a population composed of x individuals for each extreme type 1 and 4, and 54−x individuals
for each central type 2 and 3, and we vary x from 1 to 53. Each increase in x corresponds (roughly) to a mean-
preserving spread in population heterogeneity. Consistently with Proposition 5, we find that the utility of types 1
and 2 decrease as well the total utility of the group at the high equilibrium. The monotonicity is reversed at the low
equilibrium. Also, for this particular parametrization the utility of types 3 and 4 (not covered in the Proposition 5)
changes monotonically in the same direction as that of the other types.
26Of course, it is also possible that there are technological restrictions, such as increasing returns at certain levels,
which would make very small groups inefficient.
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probability of link creation is independent and identical across all links. This Bernoulli process of
link formation was first analyzed by Erdös and Rényi (1959) who establish a number of interesting
topological properties for large Bernoulli networks, that is, as the number of the nodes tends to
infinity (see Jackson (2007), Section 3.1.1 for details). In particular, when the population gets large,
the Erdös and Rényi random graph induces a Poisson distribution over network connectivities.
We analyze the topology and welfare properties of Poisson Nash networks for the richer class
of cost functions (beyond the quadratic set up) defined in (14).
We first start by noticing that this game always admits a corner equilibrium.
Lemma 3 There always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where no player invests in social-
ization effort, with symmetric equilibrium strategies
¡
b1/c, 0
¢
and payoffs cb1+1/c/ (c+ 1).
Notice that this equilibrium corresponds to the partially corner equilibrium identified in Lemma
2 for the case of quadratic costs, c = 1.
We now introduce some notations. For all α < β, define:
1(α,β] (x) =
(
1, if α < x < β
0, otherwise
.
We introduce also the following function φ : R→ R given by:
φ (x) = c
1
c+1
h
xc+1 − b1+ 1c
i 1
c+1
.
We are now ready to state the main characterization result.
Theorem 2 Suppose that c
2
2+c2
³
2
2+c2
´ 2
c2 > a1+
1
c b
2
c2 . Then, there exists an n∗ such that for all
games with n ≥ n∗ players, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium strategies converge as n goes to
infinity to the solutions to: (
sc = 1(−∞,φ(k)] (s) ak
2
kc [1− as] = b
, (15)
which has one, two or three different non-negative solutions.
It is readily checked that
¡
b1/c, 0
¢
is always a solution to (15), consistent with Lemma 3. At
this equilibrium, the network of synergies is empty.
For large enough populations, we can also have up to two interior symmetric equilibria. In-
specting (15), these interior equilibria (k∗, s∗) solve:(
sc = ak2
kc [1− as] = b
, (16)
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which generalizes (6) for arbitrary c, with the added condition that s∗ ≤ φ (k∗). After some algebra,
this last inequality is equivalent to:
ui (k∗, s∗) =
1
c+ 1
£
ck∗c+1 − s∗c+1
¤
≥ c
c+ 1
b1+
1
c = ui
³
b1/c, 0
´
. (17)
In words, the condition s∗ < φ (k∗) guarantees that
¡
b1/c, 0
¢
is not a strict best-response by some
arbitrary player i to the rest of the players playing (k∗, s∗). On top of that, the conditions on
the exogenous parameter values imposed in Theorem 2 guarantee that the first-order conditions
for interior equilibria (16) have at least one solution, and that the second-order conditions hold at
these points.
The fact that the inequality (17) holds for any interior Nash equilibrium implies that any interior
equilibrium Pareto dominates the partially corner equilibrium where players do not socialize and
invest the optimum level b1/c that corresponds to their private costs and returns.
Suppose now that the exogenous parameter values are such that two interior equilibria exist.
It turns out that their corresponding actions can also be ranked. As in Proposition 2, we can
thus speak of a low-action (interior) equilibrium and a high-action (interior) equilibrium for large
enough populations. The response to these equilibrium actions to incentives is identical to that
documented in Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 Let (k∗, s∗) ≥ (k∗∗, s∗∗) be the two ranked interior symmetric approximate equilib-
ria for a large enough population. When a increases, k∗∗ and s∗∗ increase, while k∗ and s∗ decrease.
In both cases, the percentage change in s is higher than that of k (in absolute values).
Notice that the previous result implies that s/k is an increasing function of a at equilibrium.
Factorizing by kc+1 in the expression for equilibrium payoffs given by (17), one can then readily
conclude that individual payoffs decrease with a at the high equilibrium.
6.2 The topology of Erdös-Rényi equilibrium networks
In the Erdös-Rényi (Bernoulli) random networks that correspond to the interior and symmetric
Nash equilibria of Theorem 2,27 the expected number of links to each player is s∗, and each po-
tential link in the network is created (approximately) with independent probability s∗/n when the
population gets large. The fact that link creation is i.i.d. implies, in particular, that the network
connectivity (or degree) is not correlated across different nodes.
Beyond this vanishing degree-degree correlation across nodes as the population gets larger,
large Erdös-Rényi networks display a number of interesting topological features. For instance,
when s∗ < 1, the networks is composed of a huge number of disjoint small trees. Instead, when
s∗ > 1, a single giant component that encompasses a high fraction of all the network nodes emerges.
27Note that the interpretation of our equilibrium network as a random graph requires that all link intensities are
smaller than one, which is equivalent to a < 1.
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The next result ties down the existence of a giant component to conditions on the exogenous
parameter values of the model.
Proposition 7 Let a < 1, so that equilibrium networks can be interpreted as random graphs.
Suppose that there are two non-empty equilibrium networks. Then, the two equilibrium networks
display different topological characteristics (one network with a giant component, one without) if
and only if ab2/c < (1− a)2/c. If, instead, ab2/c > ( ca+c)2, then both equilibrium networks have a
giant component.28
In some cases, both the low-action and the high-action equilibrium networks have a giant
component. In some other cases, the low-action equilibrium network is fragmented whereas the
high-action equilibrium network contains a connected component encompassing a nontrivial frac-
tion of players. In principle, Proposition 7 does not exclude the possibility of coexistence of two
fragmented equilibrium networks (for high and low actions). We conjecture, however, that the only
two possibilities are those described in Proposition 7.
Holding b = 1, Figure 3 displays for values of c ranging from 1 to 10, amin and amax, respectively
the minimum and maximum values of a for which the equilibrium exists.
[Insert F igure 3 here]
The line in between amin and amax represents a phase transition separating two parameter regions
for a and c. For values of a above this line, the two equilibrium networks have a giant component.
Instead, for values of a below this line, only the equilibrium network with low actions is fragmented.
Notice that this transition is sharp, that is, the low action equilibrium changes discontinuously
the topological properties as a function of the synergistic parameter a.
7 Discussion
We have provided a simple operational model of network formation with welfare and topology
predictions, and clear-cut comparative statics. In substance, we identify a “too cold” and a “too
hot” equilibrium. We show that socialization is more responsive than production to exogenous
shocks in the parameters and that individual preferences over group composition hint towards
assortative matching. A variation of the model with several groups allows for partially directed
socialization within groups more in line with some empirical evidence on clustering and community
structure within networks.
We show and state our results with a class of payoffs corresponding to the functional form given
in equation (4). However, the thrust of our analysis carries over to some generalizations of this
setup.
28Notice that ( ca+c )
2 ≥ (1− a)2/c. See the proof for details.
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The three main characteristics of this functional form are: the linear-quadratic expression in
production efforts, the genericity of socialization decisions (condition (A3) of Lemma 1), and ag-
gregate constant returns to scale in socialization (condition (A2) of lemma 1). The linear-quadratic
form plays an important role in the analysis, as it allows to express existence and interiority of the
production equilibrium decisions (for a given socialization profile s) as a a function of the spectral
radius of G(s). Combined with conditions (A2) and (A3), this leads to first-order conditions that
take relatively manageable closed-form matrix expression. In turn, when population gets large,
and because we are able to control the population size effect in our matrix closed-form expression,
approximate equilibrium conditions boil down to a simple system of equations (6). On top of its
operational virtues, condition (A3) is hard to dispense with as it embodies the central assumption
of our approach, the genericity of socialization. Condition (A2), instead, is chosen mainly for its
operationally virtues. We could accommodate variations of this condition, and thus alternative
expressions for gij(s) that allow for some aggregate scale effects in socialization, as long as we can
still control for population size effects. Essentially, we need that both the spectral radius of G(s)
and the diagonal cells of the matrix [I−G(s)]−1 are of finite order, while the off-diagonal terms of
the same matrix be of order inverse of the population size.
One slightly artificial feature of the model is the fact that the effort variables are unbounded.
This creates existence problems and generates the need for the assumption 2/3
√
3 > a(b). In
addition, this generates a failure of upper-hemicontinuity in the equilibrium correspondence as the
high-action equilibrium diverges to infinity as a(b) goes to zero. A simple way to deal with this
problem is to assume that the effort of each individual is bounded. That is, si + ki ≤ T. This
is natural when one interprets the sum of efforts of an individual as related to the time at his
disposal, or, more generally as activities that consume resources of this sort. It is relatively easy to
characterize the equilibria and their topological and welfare properties under this modification. In
particular, the Pareto superior equilibrium disappears for a(b)T low enough. A bounded strategy
space can introduce upper corner equilibria that may be stable.
Another economically compelling modification of the original setup is to introduce a market for
effort resources that are limited in supply. For example, suppose that there is a fixed amount of
productive effort
Pn
i=1 ki = k sold in a competitive market. If one interprets (4) as the amount of
numeraire produced by agent i, the total profit for an agent is:
⎛
⎝bτ(i) ki + a
nX
j=1
pij (s) kjki −
1
2
k2i −
1
2
s2i
⎞
⎠− pkki (18)
which is equivalent to: ¡
bτ(i) − pk
¢
ki + a
nX
j=1
pij (s) kjki −
1
2
k2i −
1
2
s2i (19)
This corresponds to our standard model, where the types are now bτ(i) − pk. An equilibrium
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(p∗k,k
∗, s∗) is now simply a solution to (6) with the modified types and the market clearing condi-
tions, for large populations.
It should be clear that, for a fixed (low enough) pk, the new system (6) has a solution. For the
low equilibrium, lowering types makes the k∗ smaller coordinatewise (this is Proposition 4). This
yields, in fact, a (downward sloping) demand function for k. Supply is a vertical line, so there is
always an equilibrium (potentially at a price of zero and excess supply). The shape of the demand
function for the high equilibrium is less straightforward because the comparative statics of the high
equilibrium as pk changes are now ambiguous (see again Proposition 4). In some cases, this demand
function will actually be upward sloping at the high equilibrium. Because upward sloping demands
give rise to unstable market dynamics, the low equilibrium is then uniquely selected.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix s. From (A3) we have gij(s) = siψj(s), where ψj : Rn+ → R+,
for all i, j. From (A2) we have
Pn
j=1 ψj(s) = 1. Multiplying the previous expression by si givesPn
j=1 siψj(s) = si. By (A1) we have siψj(s) = sjψi(s), and thus
Pn
j=1 sjψi(s) = ψi(s)
Pn
j=1 sj =
si, and the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1: It follows from the following Lemmata 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Consider an m−replica game involving n = mt players, where m ≥ 1 is fixed for the time being.
Let G(s) = [gij(s)]i,j∈N be the n−symmetric adjacency matrix for the network with link inten-
sities in (1).
For all x ∈ Rt+, define x =
Pt
τ=1 xτ/t, x
2 =
Pt
τ=1 x
2
τ/t, and:
λ(x) =
ax
x− ax2
.
We extend this definition to any non-negative vector in an Euclidean space of arbitrary size.
Lemma 4 Let s∈ Rn+, s 6= 0 such that 1 > a s2/s. Then,M(s)= [I−aG(s)]−1 is a well-defined and
non-negative n−square matrix, equal to M(s)= I+ λ(s)G(s).
Proof. WhenM(s) ∈ Rn2 is well-defined, we haveM(s) =
P+∞
p=0 a
pG(s)p.We compute G(s)p.
First, note that (we omit s when there is no confusion):
g[2]ij =
nX
l=1
gilglj =
sisj
ns
nX
h=1
s2h
ns
=
s2
s
gij , for all i, j = 1, ..., n
By a trivial induction on p = 1, 2, ..., we deduce that g[p]ij = (s
2/s)
p
gij , for all i, j and all p ≥ 1.
Therefore:
M(s) = I+
+∞X
p=1
Ã
a
s2
s
!p
G = I+ λ(s)G(s).
We know from Debreu and Herstein (1953) that M(s) is well-defined and non-negative if and
only if 1 > aρ(G(s)), where ρ(G(s)) is the modulus of the largest eigenvalue of G(s) (see also
Theorem 1 in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2006). Let us show that ρ(G(s)) = s2/s.
First, note that s2/s is an eigenvalue of G for the eigenvector s. Indeed, G · s= (s2/s) s.
Second, let x such that kxk = 1. We have:
G · x =s · x
ns
s,
where s · x =Pni=1 sixi is the scalar product, with |s · x| ≤ ksk × kxk ≤ ksk. Therefore, kG · xk ≤
ksk2 /ns = s2/s. Note that, by definition, ρ(G) = sup {kG · xk / kxk : kxk = 1}. Altogether, we
can conclude that ρ(G) = s2/s.
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Let now m1,m2,m3, ... be an increasing sequence of integers such that mh → +∞ as h→ +∞.
Each h ∈ N defines a mh−replica game involving nh = mht players. In the mh−replica game,
there are mh players of each type (b1, ..., bt). In each such game, a profile of strategies is
¡
kh, sh
¢
∈
Rnh+ ×Rnh+ . Given a player i = 1, ..., nh, recall that bτ(i) denotes his type, where τ (i) ∈ T .
Lemma 5 Let
©¡
kh, sh
¢ ª
h∈N be a sequence of Nash equilibria of the m
h−replica games such that
1 > ash2/sh, for all h ∈ N. Suppose that the system of equations:(
[1− a(b)s] k = 1
s = a(b)k2
(20)
has a solution (k, s) ∈ R2+ such that 1 > a(b)s. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists some hε ∈ N such
that, for all h ≥ hε, we have max{
¯¯
khi − bτ(i)k
¯¯
,
¯¯
shi − bτ(i)s
¯¯} < ε, for all i = 1, ..., nh, where (k, s)
is a solution to (20).
Proof. Let
©¡
kh, sh
¢ ª
h∈N be a sequence of Nash equilibria such that 1 > a(s
h), for all h.
Let diag
¡
G
¡
sh
¢¢
be the diagonal matrix with diagonal terms gii
¡
sh
¢
and zero off-diagonal terms.
For each h, using the expression for [I − aG(sh)]−1 ∈ Rnh
2
in Lemma 4, we write the first-order
necessary equilibrium conditions for kh as:
kh + a
h
I+ λ(sh)G
³
sh
´i
·diag
³
G
³
sh
´´
·kh =
h
I+ λ(sh)G
³
sh
´i
·bh, (21)
where bh ∈ Rnh+ is defined by bhi = bτ(i), for all i = 1, ..., nh. In words, the ith coordinate of bh
corresponds to the private returns of player i’s type. Note that the nh coordinates of bh take t
different possible values, b1, ..., bt, each repeated mh times.
The first-order conditions for shi are:
shi = ak
h
i
sh·kh
nhsh
− ashi khi
sh·kh
(nhsh)2
− as
h
i k
h2
i
nhsh
+ a
sh2i k
h2
i
(nhsh)2
. (22)
Given that 1 > ash2/sh, for all h and that nh → +∞ as h → +∞, necessarily, shi ∈ O (1), for
all i = 1, ..., nh and for all h. Indeed, suppose that shi ∈ O
¡
nh
p¢
, p > 0, for some j. Let then q > 0
such that shi ∈ O
¡
nh
q¢
, q > 0, for all i. Then, ash2/sh ∈ O(nhq), and the inequality 1 > ash2/sh
is violated for large enough h. Given that shi ∈ O (1), we have gij
¡
sh
¢
= shi s
h
j /
³Pnh
l=1 s
h
l
´
∈ o (1)
when h→ +∞, for all i, j = 1, ..., nh
The first-order conditions (21) imply that khi ∈ O (1), for all i = 1, ..., nh and for all h.
Then, using (22), we deduce that for h high enough, we have
shi = ak
h
i
sh·kh
nhsh
+ o (1) , for all i = 1, ..., nh and for all h.
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By (21), khi is a continuous function of s
h. Therefore, shi = κ
h
i + o (1) and k
h
i = σ
h
i + o (1), for
all i = 1, ..., nh and for all h, where
¡
σh,κh
¢
are such that:
σh =
h
I+ λ(κh)G
³
κh
´i
·bh, (23)
and
κhi = aσ
h
i
κh·σh
nhκh
, i = 1, ..., nh. (24)
We solve (23) and (24).
Note, first, that (24) implies that σhi /κ
h
i = σ
h
j /κ
h
j , for all i, j. Without any loss of generality, we
can thus write κhi = θ
h
i s and σ
h
i = θ
h
i k, for all i = 1, ..., n
h and for some k, s. Then, (24) rewrites
as:
s = ak2
θh2
θh
, (25)
Noting that gij
¡
κh
¢
= θhi θ
h
j s/n
hθh, we rewrite (23) as:
θhi k = b
h
i +
as
nh
θhi
θh − aθh2s
nhX
j=1
θhj b
h
j , (26)
for all i = 1, ..., nh.
Let θhi = b
h
i . Then, (26) becomes:
k = 1 +
ab2s
b− ab2s
=
1
1− a(b)s,
while (25) becomes s = a(b)k2.
Note that the condition 1 > ash2/sh is then equivalent to 1 > a(b)s.
Lemma 6 If 2/3
√
3 > a(b), then the system of equations (20) has exactly two solutions (k, s) ∈ R2+
such that 1 > a(b)s.
Proof. Plugging the expression for k into the expression for s in (20), one concludes that every
solution (k∗, s∗) of (20) is such that g (s∗) = s∗, where;
g(s) =
a(b)
(1− a(b)s)2
. (27)
We establish conditions such that the graph of g(s) crosses (twice) the 45 degree line for some
s such that 1 > a(b)s. Note that g (0) = a(b) and lims↑1/a(b) g (s) = +∞, so that the function
g (·) maps [0, 1/a(b)) into [a(b),+∞), while g0 (0) = a(b)2 and lims↑1/a(b) g0 (s) = +∞. If there
exists a tangent to the graph of g (·) on [0, 1/a(b)) parallel to the 45 degree line, and if this tangent
is strictly below (resp. tangent to) the 45 degree line, the system (20) has exactly two solutions
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(resp. one solution) on [0, 1/a(b)). Such a tangent exists if a(b) ≤ 1, which we assume from now
on. Next, we solve
g0(x∗) = 1⇔ a(b)x∗ = 1−
¡
2a(b)2
¢1/3
(28)
Thus, (20) has two solutions (resp. one solution) if and only if a(b) ≤ 1 and g(x∗) < x∗ (resp.
g(x∗) = x∗), where x∗ is defined by (28). The last inequality is equivalent to a(b) < 2/3
√
3 ≤ 1.
When a(b) < 2/3
√
3 (resp. a(b) = 2/3
√
3), the graph of g (·) thus crosses the 45 degree line twice
(resp. once) on [0, 1/a(b)).
Lemma 7 Let
©¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢ ª
h∈N be such that k
h∗
i = kbτ(i) and s
h∗
i = sbτ(i), for all i = 1, ..., n
h,
where (k, s) is some given solution to (20). If 2/3
√
3 > a(b), then there exists some h ∈ N such
that, for all h ≥ h, the second-order equilibrium conditions for u = (u1, ..., unh) hold at
¡
k∗h, s∗h
¢
.
Proof. First note that Lemma 6 implies that (20) has a solution such that 1 > a(b)s. Consider
this solution. We also know from Lemma 5 that both shi , k
h
i ∈ O (1), for all i = 1, ..., nh. We now
compute the cross partial derivatives of u at
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
.
First, we have:
∂ui
∂si
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
=
a
nhsh∗
nhX
j=1,j 6=i
³
kh∗i k
h∗
j s
h∗
j − gij
³
sh∗
´
kh∗i k
h∗
j
´
− sh∗i (29)
∂ui
∂ki
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= bτ(i) + a
nhX
j=1,j 6=i
gij
³
sh∗
´
kh∗j − kh∗i (30)
Thus
∂2ui
∂s2i
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
=
2a
(nhsh∗)2
nhX
j=1,j 6=i
³
−kh∗i kh∗j sh∗j + gij
³
sh∗
´
kh∗i k
h∗
j
´
− 1
∂2ui
∂si∂ki
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
=
a
nhsh∗
nhX
j=1,j 6=i
³
kh∗j s
h∗
j − gij
³
sh∗
´
kh∗j
´
∂2ui
∂k2i
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= −1
So, for h large enough, we get:
∂2ui
∂s2i
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= o (1)− 1 (31)
∂2ui
∂si∂ki
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= o (1) + ak
b2
b
= o (1) + a(b)k (32)
∂2ui
∂k2i
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= −1 (33)
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The second-order conditions amount to checking that the principal minors of the Hessian have
alternating signs. But the determinant of a matrix is a continuous (polynomial) function of the
matrix entries. Given that (31) and (33), are negative, when h → +∞, we are thus left to check
that the sign of the determinant is positive. This amounts to checking:
1− a(b)2k2 > 0
and by the second equation in (20) this is equivalent to checking:
1− a(b)s > 0
But Lemma 6 shows that this necessarily holds when 2/3
√
3 > a(b).
Proof of Proposition 1: Let  > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1 holds for this
. We check stability by looking at the behavior of the gradient system
∂si(t)
∂t
=
∂ui(s(t),k(t))
∂si(t)
(34)
∂ki(t)
∂t
=
∂ui(s(t),k(t))
∂ki(t)
(35)
around the equilibrium points.
Let us first look at the partially corner equilibrium. By (29) we have that the first derivative
with respect to si when h is large is
o (1) +
a
nhsh∗
nhX
j=1
kh∗i k
h∗
j s
h∗
j − sh∗i
Let a perturbation around the equilibrium sε = (ε1, ..., εn), with b = min{b1, ..., bn}. Then, the first
derivative with respect to si is approximately
abi
Pn
j=1 εjbjPn
j=1 εj
− εi > abib− εi > 0,
for εi small enough. For any small enough perturbation, si would tend to increase for all i, thus
negating stability.
If we linearize the dynamic system (34)−(35) around the equilibria we get, for all i = 1, ..., nh:
∂si(t)
∂t
=
nhX
j=1
∂2ui
∂si∂sj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´¡
sj(t)− s∗j
¢
+
nhX
j=1
∂2ui
∂si∂kj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´ ¡
kj(t)− k∗j
¢
(36)
∂ki(t)
∂t
=
nhX
j=1
∂2ui
∂ki∂kj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´ ¡
kj(t)− k∗j
¢
+
nhX
j=1
∂2ui
∂ki∂sj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´ ¡
sj(t)− s∗j
¢
34
For i 6= j we have:
∂2ui
∂si∂sj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
=
a
nhsh∗
kh∗i k
h∗
j −
a
(nhsh∗)2
kh∗i k
h∗
j s
h∗
i
+
a
(nhsh∗)2
nhX
r=1,r 6=i
³
2gir
³
sh∗
´
kh∗i k
h∗
r − kh∗i kh∗r sh∗r
´
∂2ui
∂si∂kj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
=
a
nhsh∗
³
kh∗i s
h∗
j − gij
³
sh∗
´
kh∗i
´
∂2ui
∂ki∂sj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
=
a
nhsh∗
(kh∗j s
h∗
i −
nhX
r=1,r 6=i
gir
³
sh∗
´
kh∗r )
∂2ui
∂ki∂kj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= agij
³
sh∗
´
Thus, we have when h gets large and for i 6= j:
∂2ui
∂si∂sj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= o (1) (37)
∂2ui
∂si∂kj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= o (1) (38)
∂2ui
∂ki∂sj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= o (1) (39)
∂2ui
∂ki∂kj
³
kh∗, sh∗
´
= o (1) (40)
The coefficients of the linearized gradient system (36) correspond to the cells of a 2nh × 2nh
matrix Πh
¡¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢¢
which, when h is large enough, gets arbitrarily close to the following matrix
Πh:
Πh =
"
A,B
B,A
#
where A,B are the following nh × nh matrices
A =
"
−1, ..., 0
0, ...,−1
#
,B =
"
a(b)k, ..., 0
0, ..., a(b)k
#
,
Now the matrix Πh has the following eigenvalues:
1. λ1i = −1+a(b)k, for i = 1, 2, ..., nh, corresponding to the eigenvector νi = [ih, ih], i = 2, ..., nh
where ih is an nh × 1 vector containing a 1 in position i = 1, 2, ..., nh and 0’s in the other
nh − 1 positions.
2. λ2i = −1 − a(b)k, for i = 1, 2, ..., nh, corresponding to the eigenvector νi = [ih,−ih], i =
2, ..., nh where ih is an nh × 1 vector containing a 1 in position i = 1, 2, ..., nh and 0’s in the
other nh − 1 positions.
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The eigenvalues λ2i are necessarily negative. The eigenvalues λ
1
i are negative if 1− a(b)k > 0.
But this is true provided that:
1− a(b)2k2 > 0
and by the second equation in (20) this is equivalent to checking
1− a(b)s > 0
But Lemma 6 shows that this necessarily holds when 2/3
√
3 > a(b).
Proof of Proposition 2: Let  > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1 holds for
this . We denote by
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
and
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
the corresponding −equilibria, where kh∗i =
k∗bτ(i), s
h∗
i = s
∗bτ(i), and kh∗∗i = k
∗∗bτ(i), s
h∗∗
i = s
∗∗bτ(i), for all i = 1, ..., nh, and (k∗, s∗) , (k∗∗, s∗∗)
are the two different solutions to (20). Suppose that kh∗i ≥ kh∗∗i , for some i. Then, necessarily,
k∗ ≥ k∗∗. By (20), we deduce that s∗ ≥ s∗∗. Therefore, both kh∗i ≥ kh∗∗i and sh∗i ≥ sh∗∗i , for all
i = 1, ..., nh.
To show the welfare ranking of the −equilibria, we first use the expression for payoffs in (4)
and the first-order conditions for khi , to obtain the following expression for −equilibrium payoffs
for
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
:
uh∗i =
b2τ(i)
2
¡
k∗2 − s∗2
¢
+ o (1) , for all i = 1, ..., nh.
Next, using the fact that (k∗, s∗) are solutions to (6), we write:
k∗2 − s∗2 = s
∗
a(b)
− s∗2 = s
∗
a(b)
(1− a(b)s∗) = 1
a(b)
s∗
k∗
= k∗, (41)
and thus:
uh∗i =
b2τ(i)
2
k∗ + o (1) , for all i = 1, ..., nh,
and similarly for the −equilibrium payoffs uh∗∗i corresponding to
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
. Since, by definition
k∗ ≥ k∗∗ the welfare at the equilibrium
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
is higher than at the equilibrium
¡
kh∗, sh∗∗
¢
.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4: Let  > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1
holds for this . We denote by
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
and
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
the corresponding −equilibria, where¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
≥
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
are computed with two different solutions (k∗, s∗) ≥ (k∗∗, s∗∗) of (20). On
the (k, s) plane, an increase in a(b) results in a downward shift of the graph of:
k =
1
1− a(b)s, (42)
and an upward shift of the graph of:
s = a(b)k2. (43)
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Therefore, the equilibrium actions of the Pareto-inferior equilibrium
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
all increase,
while those of the Pareto-superior equilibrium
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
all decrease. The elasticity η that keeps
track of the relative changes on s and k when a(b) varies is:
η =
s
k
∂k
∂a(b)
∂s
∂a(b)
.
Differentiating (42) and (43) with respect to a(b) gives:
∂k
∂a(b)
= sk2 + ak2
∂s
∂a(b)
∂s
∂a(b)
= k2 + 2
s
k
∂k
∂a(b)
Solving for the two partial derivatives gives:
∂k
∂a(b)
=
2sk2
1− 2ask (44)
∂s
∂a(b)
=
k2
1− 2ask
µ
2
s2
k
+ 1
¶
(45)
and thus:
η =
s
k
∂k
∂a(b)
∂s
∂a(b)
=
2s2
k + 2s2
< 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let  > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1 holds for this
. We denote by
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
and
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
the corresponding −equilibria, where
¡
kh∗, sh∗
¢
≥¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
are computed with two different solutions (k∗, s∗) ≥ (k∗∗, s∗∗) of (20).
1. From equation (41) in the proof of Proposition 2, we have
k∗2 − s∗2 = s
∗
a(b)
− s∗2 = s
∗
a(b)
(1− a(b)s∗) = 1
a(b)
s∗
k∗
= k∗,
and thus:
uh∗i =
b2τ(i)
2
k∗ + o (1) =
b2τ(i)
2a(b)
s∗
k∗
+ o (1) , for all i = 1, ..., nh,
and similarly for the −equilibrium payoffs uh∗∗i corresponding to
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
.
When only a increases, while all the bt’s remain constant, the comparative statics of equi-
librium payoffs are those of productive actions. Since we know from equation (44) that
∂k
∂a(b) =
2sk2
1−2ask , the result follows in that case.
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Let us then turn to the case when we multiply a and each bτ ,τ ∈ T by a common factor δ ≥ 1.
Then, a(b) increases to δ2a(b), while 2a(b)/b2τ remains unchanged. Therefore, individual
−equilibrium payoffs move in the same direction than s∗/k∗ and s∗∗/k∗∗. We know from the
proof of Proposition 3 that, following an increase in a(b), the equilibrium actions increase at
the Pareto-inferior equilibrium
¡
kh∗∗, sh∗∗
¢
and decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium.
Graphically, one can immediately conclude that s∗/k∗ decreases while s∗∗/k∗∗ increases, and
the result follows in that case. A more formal argument is the following. It is readily checked
that
∂s/k
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
> 0⇔ k ∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
> s
∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
. (46)
We know that, at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium, both ∂k
∗∗
∂δ
¯¯
δ=1 > 0 and
∂s∗∗
∂δ
¯¯
δ=1 > 0.
Therefore, ∂s
∗∗/k∗∗
∂δ
¯¯¯
δ=1
> 0 is equivalent to η < 1, which is true from Proposition 3. Instead,
at the Pareto-superior equilibrium we have both ∂k
∗
∂δ
¯¯
δ=1 > 0 and
∂s∗
∂δ
¯¯
δ=1 > 0, so that
∂s∗/k∗
∂δ
¯¯¯
δ=1
< 0 is equivalent to η < 1 which, again, follows from Proposition 3.
2. From equation (9) we have that
mtX
i=1
ui '
mtX
i=1
b2τ(i)
2a(b)
s
k
=
m
a
s
k
tX
τ=1
bτ
Now notice that a(b) increases by assumption in our case. Thus
mtP
i=1
ui decreases for the
high equilibrium since s∗/k∗ increases and
tP
τ=1
bτ is constant. And
mtP
i=1
ui increases for the low
equilibrium since s∗∗/k∗∗ increases and
tP
τ=1
bτ is constant. Now let and individual i with lower
than average bτ(i). We know that at the low equilibrium s/k decreases. Also,
1
2a(b) decreases
(since .
tP
τ=1
bτ and .
tP
τ=1
b2τ increases). And, since his type is lower than average, b
2
τ(i) must also
decrease. Thus,.
³
b2τ(i)/2a(b)
´
(s/k) decreases and the result follows.
Proof of Remark 3: The result is immediate from equation (10) and from equation (44) in
the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Theorem 2: The proof follows ceteris paribus from that of Theorem 1.
First, we rewrite Lemma 5 by simply taking to the power of c the left-hand side terms in the
first-order conditions (21) and (22), and the approximated first-order conditions (23) and (24).
Then, (25) and (26) yields (15).
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Second, rewriting equation (27) in Lemma 6 we get:
gc (s) =
a
1
c b
2
c2
(1− as)
2
c2
,
so that the solution to (28) is such that (1− ax∗)
2
c2
+1 = 2c2a
1+1c b
2
c2 , that is, ax∗ = 1−
³
2
c2a
1+ 1c b
2
c2
´ c2
2+c2 .
The equilibrium conditions gc (x∗) < x∗ then boils down to a1+
1
c b
2
c2 < c
2
2+c2
³
2
2+c2
´ 2
c2 after some
simple algebra.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let’s multiply both a and b by a common factor δ ≥ 1. Equations
(15) become: (
sc = δak2
kc [1− δas] = δb
.
Differentiating with respect to δ and letting δ = 1 gives:
csc−1
∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
= ak2 + 2ak
∂k
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
ckc−1
∂k
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
(1− as) = b+ kc
∙
as+ a
∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
¸
Simplifying gives:
c
∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
− 2 s
k
∂k
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
= s
−ak ∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
+ c (1− as) ∂k
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
= k
Finally, solving for the two partial derivatives yields to
∂s
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
=
2 + c
c2 (1− as)− 2ass (47)
∂k
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=1
=
as+ c (1− as)
c2 (1− as)− 2ask
Therefore, both partial derivatives are of the same sign, which is positive if and only if as <
c2/
¡
2 + c2
¢
. In the same spirit of the proof of Proposition 5, one can check graphically that the
equilibrium actions of the low-actions equilibrium increase with δ whereas the equilibrium actions
of the high-actions equilibrium decrease with δ. Then, noting from (46) that the elasticity is smaller
than one whenever the slope s/k increases, s and k either all increase or all decrease, the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 7: At an interior equilibrium, the strategies (k, s) solve:(
sc = ak2
kc [1− as] = b
,
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The first equation is:
s = f (k) = a1/ck2/c.
It is readily checked that f (·) is increasing, strictly concave (resp. convex) when c < 2 (resp. c > 2)
and a straight line when c = 2 on [0,+∞). Also, f (0) = 0 and limx↑+∞ f (x) = +∞. Finally, note
that:
k = f−1 (s) =
³ s
a1/c
´c/2
.
The second equation is:
k = g (s) = b1/c (1− as)−1/c .
It is readily checked that g (·) is increasing and strictly convex on [0, 1/a), with g (0) = b1/c and
limx↑1/ab g (x) = +∞.
Suppose that the equilibrium existence conditions hold. Let (k, s) and
¡
s, k
¢
be the two different
equilibria, where s > k (and, thus, k > s). The two corresponding equilibrium networks are such
that only one has a giant component if and only if s > 1 > k.
Let a < 1, so that we have a random graph.
Note that the graph of g (·) lies below the graph of f−1 (·) only when s ∈ [k, s]. Therefore,
s > 1 > k is equivalent to g (1) < f−1 (1). After some algebra, this is equivalent to:
ab2/c < (1− a)2/c . (48)
Notice that the right-hand side of this inequality is well-defined given our assumption that
a < 1.
When (48) holds, we can conclude that the two equilibrium networks display two different
topological characteristics: the densely connected network has a giant component whereas the
sparsely connected network doesn’t.
Reciprocally, when (48) does not hold, we can conclude that either both equilibrium networks
have a giant component, or none does. We now provide an additional sufficient condition such that
both have giant component when both a < 1 and ab2/c > (1− a)2/c.
Consider the line tangent to the graph of g (·) at the point (0, g (0)) with equation:
h (s) = g0 (0) s+ g (0) = b1/c
ha
c
s+ 1
i
.
The graph of g (·) lies above that of h (·) on [0, 1/a) (recall that g (·) is strictly convex on that
half-segment). Consider the region on the (s, k) space delimited to the left by the vertical axis, from
above by the graph of g (·), from below by the graph of f−1 (·) and to the right by the point (k, s)
at the intersection of these two graphs. If the point (1, h (1)) lies in this region, then necessarily
1 < k. Analytically, (1, h (1)) lies in this region if and only if h (1) > f−1 (1). After some algebra,
this is equivalent to:
ab2/c > (
c
a+ c
)2.
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When a < 1, we can thus conclude that both networks have a giant component when:
ab2/c > max{(1− a)2/c , ( c
a+ c
)2}.
We now compare the two terms on the right-hand side of the inequality. Let:
ξ (x) =
1
1 + ax
and ζ (x) = (1− a)x , where x ∈ [0, 1].
Then,
³
c
a+c
´2
> (1− a)2/c for some c ≥ 1 if and only if ξ (1/c) > ζ (1/c).
Note that ξ (0) = ζ (0) = 1, ξ (1) = 1/ (1 + a) ≥ ζ (1) = 1 − a (with a strict inequality when
a 6= 0), and ξ0 (0) = −a > ζ 0 (0) = log (1− a). Given the strict convexity of both functions on [0, 1],
we can conclude that ξ (x) > ζ (x) on 0 < x < 1.
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